Keeping Free Speech Free in the College Marketplace of Ideas: California Legislation as an Imperfect Solution to Censorship by University Administrators by Ross, Jennifer
Keeping Free Speech Free in the College
Marketplace of Ideas: California
Legislation as an Imperfect Solution
to Censorship by University
Administrators
By JENNIFER Ross*
PICTURE JANE SMITH, an English major in her last month of col-
lege at a private California university. Jane writes a weekly column for
her school's student-run newspaper. Last week, Jane published a con-
troversial article criticizing the administration for an unfair grading
policy. Administrators, including the college dean, demanded that the
newspaper print a correction, refused to pay the newspaper's pub-
lisher until the newspaper complied, and threatened Jane with sus-
pension for similar articles. The student newspaper, takingJane's side,
refused to print a correction, However, it cannot publish further is-
sues without the university's payment to the printer and ceases publi-
cation.' Jane graduates, having lost the opportunity to publish three
more columns.
Jane brings claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
college, as well as the college dean and other administrators, under
two separate statutes. Her first claim falls under California Education
Code section 66301,2 as amended by Assembly Bill 2581 ("A.B.
2581").3 A.B. 2581 was passed in response to the Seventh Circuit's re-
* Class of 2007; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 2002; Technical Editor,
U.S.K Law Review, Volume 41. The author would like to thank Nicole Magaline for
encouraging her pursuit of this topic, and her editor, Nicholas Tsukamaki, for thorough
and insightful assistance in preparing this piece for publication. This Comment was
inspired, in part, by the author's experiences as a former Editor-in-Chief of the USF law
school newspaper, The Forum.
1. This scenario is a hybrid of the facts of Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir.
2005), and Antebi v. Occidental College, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277 (Ct. App. 2006).
2. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007) (prohibiting public col-
leges from imposing disciplinary sanctions on students for speech or other expression that
would be protected by the First Amendment outside the school).
3. SeeAssemb. B. 2581, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
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cent decision in Hosty v. Carter, as well as a memorandum distributed
to the presidents of the California State University ("CSU") discussing
Hosty.4 Hosty received widespread criticism for applying a restrictive
standard to college students' speech that departed from previous fed-
eral cases.5 Responding to this threat, California legislators designed
A.B. 2581 to prevent college administrators from using Hosty to silence
the student press.
6
Reviewing this claim, the court rules that Jane lacks standing be-
cause section 66301 only applies to public college students in Califor-
nia,7 and she attends a private college. Despite this setback, Jane is
confident she will prevail in her second claim, brought under Califor-
nia's Leonard Law, California Education Code section 94367.8 The
Leonard Law extends First Amendment protections to private college
students in California by statute.9 However, because Jane's suit is
against administrators, not her college, and the Leonard Law specifi-
cally prohibits colleges from censoring students, the court questions
whether she may sue the administrators directly.
Elaborating on this uncertainty, the court reasons that public col-
lege students only obtained specific statutory authority to sue their
administrators after A.B. 2581 added new language to Education
4. 412 F.3d 731; see ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, AB 2581 Biu. ANALYSIS 2 (May 9,
2006), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_2551-2600/ab_2581_cfa
_20060505_165444_asmcomm.html [hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS] (" [E] xisting law could be
considered sufficient to cover both administrators and the student press. However, a re-
cent court decision[, i.e., Hosty], and [the] CSU memo, led [the author and sponsor] to
introduce this bill. .. ."); see also Evan Mayor, California Governor Signs College Student Press
Freedom Bill: Law Passed in the Wake of the Hosty v. Carter Decision Is the First of Its Kind in the
Country, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER, Aug. 28, 2006, at 1, www.splc.org/printpage.asp?id=
1316&tb=newsflash [hereinafter Mayor, Calfornia] (discussing Hosty as a motivating factor
for A.B. 2581). While Seventh Circuit case law is not normally a concern in California,
Christine Helwick, general counsel to the CSU system, sent a memo to the presidents of
the schools, stating that Hosty may give CSU campuses "more latitude than previously be-
lieved to censor the content of subsidized student newspapers." See Memorandum, Califor-
nia State University Office of General Counsel, to CSU Presidents, from Christine Helwick,
General Counsel, Subject: Recent Court Decisions (June 30, 2005), at 1, available at http://
www.splc.org/csu/memo.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum].
5. See, e.g., Michael 0. Finnigan, Jr., Note, Extra! Extra! Read All About It! Censorship at
State Universities: Hosty v. Carter, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 1477, 1478 (2006).
6. See Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
7. See infta Part II.A.
8. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002).
9. See id. § 94367(a). In Antebi, the California Court of Appeal held that a recent
private college graduate lacked standing to sue under the Leonard Law because the stu-
dent sued after graduation, even though the alleged censorship occurred while he was a
student. Antebi v. Occidental Coll., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 280 (Ct. App. 2006).
[Vol. 41
FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE MARKETPLACE
Code section 66301.10 Comparing section 66301's specific prohibition
of administrative censorship with the Leonard Law's failure to discuss
administrators in the private school context,' the court reasons that
the Leonard Law was not meant to cover censorship by private univer-
sity administrators. Further, the court suggests the legislature would
have included language similar to A.B. 2581 in the Leonard Law if it
intended to provide students with direct relief against administrators
for their actions. 12 The hassle of litigation and threat of suit, the court
reasons, may interfere with administrators' effectuation of their du-
ties. Thus, the court concludes that these concerns preclude Jane's
suit against her college's administrators.
Continuing its analysis of Jane's Leonard Law claim, the court
cites a recent California Court of Appeal case, Antebi v. Occidental Col-
lege,t 3 which read a "current enrollment" standing requirement into
the Leonard Law.14 Following Antebi, the court holds that Jane lacks
standing under the Leonard Law because she is no longer currently
enrolled. Jane's case is dismissed, and she vows never to write for an-
other newspaper again.
Unfortunately, Jane's situation is consistent with a history of insti-
tutional intolerance for free expression in California's universities. In
1964, thousands of college students at the University of California at
Berkeley campus participated in sit-ins, rallies, and protests in their
fight for freedom of speech and expression in higher education. 15 Sig-
nificantly, the free speech movement accomplished the students'
goals: the administration capitulated and gradually allowed free politi-
10. See Assemb. B. 2581, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); Mayor, California, supra
note 4, at 1.
11. Compare CAL. Eouc. CODE § 66301 (a) (West Supp. 2007) with CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 94367.
12. The Leonard Law does not state that private college students may sue administra-
tors, and until A.B. 2581 amended section 66301, public college students could not sue
administrators directly for censorship. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 with CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 94367.
13. 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277.
14. Taking the hypothetical one step further, if Jane had attended a public college,
the court might apply Antebis reasoning to dismiss a section 66301 suit against the college's
administrators. Section 66301 and the Leonard Law have nearly identical language, such
that the court could read the same current-enrollment requirement into section 66301
that Antebi read into the Leonard Law. See discussion infta Part III.C.
15. See ROBERT COHEN & REGINALD E. ZELNIK, THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: REFLEC-
TIONS ON BERKELEY IN THE 1960s, at i (2002); MAX HEIRICH, THE SPIRAL OF CONFIcT: BERKE-
LEY, 1964, at 1-2 (1971).
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cal expression on Berkeley's campus. 16 However, decades later, col-
lege and graduate students in California continue to petition courts
with claims of censorship by university administrators.' 7
Jane's dilemma, one example of these claims, demonstrates that
the legislature must amend section 66301 and the Leonard Law in
order to adequately protect California college students' speech from
administrative censorship. Section 66301, as amended by A.B. 2581,
only goes halfway in response to Hosty v. Carter it applies to public
college students but does not mention private college students.' 8 Like-
wise, the Leonard Law-the statute to which private college students
in California must turn-only states that "private postsecondary edu-
cational institutions" may not censor their students. 19 Second, the cur-
rent-enrollment requirement that Antebi reads into the Leonard Law20
seriously reduces the opportunity for private college students to in-
voke the protections of the Leonard Law.21 The same crippling stand-
ing limitation of Antebi could also be read into California Education
Code section 66301, which has a remedial provision identical to that
in the Leonard Law.2 2 If Antebi's standing limitation were read into
section 66301, it would prevent recent graduates, both public and pri-
16. See THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: REVOLUTION AT BERKELEY, at xxix (Michael
V. Miller & Susan Gilmore eds., 1965) ("December 8: Academic Senate meets and votes
824 to 115 for the five-point proposal made by the Committee on Academic Freedom
against the control of student speech and political advocacy. FSM states full support for the
faculty position."). The Free Speech Movement ("FSM") was formed from a united front of
student leaders as well as an executive committee of representatives from various organiza-
tions. See id. at xxvi.
17. See Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2002); Head v. Trustees of Cal. State
Univ., No. C05-05328WHA, 2006 WL 2355209, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Gallagher v. Univ. of
Cal. Hastings, No. C011277PJH, 2001 WL 1006809, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Antebi, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 279; Head v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., No. H029129, 2007 WL 118882, at *1
(Cal. Super. 2007); see also Khademi v. S. Orange County Comm. Coll., 194 F. Supp. 2d
1011, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concerning students' challenges to community college dis-
trict's policies regulating the time, place, and manner of student speech).
18. See Assemb. B. 2581, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); see discussion infra Part II.A.
19. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a) (West 2002).
20. See Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
21. See Scott Sternberg, California Court Says Former Occidental Student Can Not Sue Under
Leonard Law: Antebi Vows to Appeal, Pursue Defamation Charges, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER,
Sept. 13, 2006, at 1, http://www.splc.org/pfintpage.asp?id=1323&tb=newsflash. As one
commentator notes, "[t]he summer of 2005 will be remembered as a rough season for
student rights. The worst legal decision of the summer was Host, v. Carter.... Another
harmful summer ruling was Antebi v. Occidental College." Greg Lukianoff, Wronging Student
Rights, BosT. GLOBE, Sept. 3, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.thefire.org/pdfs/8c9ale56
af22dda5de9f471f9588971f.pdf (italics added).
22. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 (b) (West Supp. 2007) with CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 94367(b).
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vate, from bringing suit against universities for retaliatory or discipli-
nary censorship. Section 66301 and the Leonard Law should be
retooled to ensure true freedom of speech for both public and private
college students in California.
Part I of this Comment reviews key federal court cases addressing
censorship of student speech. It also analyzes Hosty's unprecedented
application of Hazelwood to college speech and argues that the Hazel-
wood standard will have a chilling effect on college students' expres-
sion. Part II summarizes current California law related to college
students' expression, including A.B. 2581, the Leonard Law, and
Antebi.
Part III shows that A.B. 2581 is an incomplete response to the
threat posed by Hosty because it only applies to public college stu-
dents. This Part then demonstrates that unlike section 66301, the Leo-
nard Law does not prohibit administrators or other officials from
censoring private college students. This Part then critiques the new
standing limitations read into the Leonard Law by the California
Court of Appeal in Antebi.
Part IV argues that in order for A.B. 2581 to go the full distance
in fostering a "marketplace of ideas" 23 in California, the legislature
should pass additional bills to protect private college students from
Hosty-type administrative censorship. Under Antebi's reasoning, private
college students in California will have more difficulty meeting stand-
ing requirements in pursuing claims for unlawful censorship. Like-
wise, public college students are vulnerable to the possibility that a
California court will apply Antebi's standing requirements to section
66301. As a solution, Part IV suggests that the legislature amend the
Leonard Law and Education Code section 66301 to allow suits by for-
mer students who recently graduated or were expelled from a college
or university as a result of their unpopular speech, provided that the
former students were censored or disciplined by the institution for
expression that occurred while they were enrolled as students. These
amendments are essential to prevent administrators from regulating
the free flow of ideas in California's colleges. Freedom of speech may
never be an absolute right, but regulation of college students' speech
23. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes crafted the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor to
describe the process of separating truth from falsity. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 899 (2001). He believed "'the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market."' Id. (quoting Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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should be minimized to ensure true academic freedom and a robust
exchange of ideas, necessary for fostering democracy. 24
I. Federal Cases Framing the Free Speech Rights of College
Students
A. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier and Public/Non-Public Forum Analysis
In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,25 the United States Supreme Court per-
mitted sweeping administrative censorship of a high school newspa-
per.26 The high school principal at Hazelwood East deleted two pages
of articles from the May 13, 1983 issue of the school's newspaper
before it was published as part of a journalism class. 27 The deleted
articles concerned "students' experiences with pregnancy," and "the
impact of divorce on students at the school." 28 The Court first asked
whether a high school newspaper was a "forum for public expression"
deserving the same First Amendment protections as general public
fora for speech and assembly. 29 In performing this forum analysis, the
court considered whether "school authorities have 'by policy or by
practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general
public,' . . . or by some segment of the public, such as student organi-
zations. '30 The court distinguished Tinker v. Des Moines School District,3 1
a previous case where students wore armbands in a manner unrelated
24. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (discussing the impor-
tance of "safeguarding academic freedom" and holding state regulations restricting teach-
ers' conduct to be unconstitutionally overbroad). In somewhat ominous tones, the
Supreme Court in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), warned against the conse-
quences of censorship, noting that " [ t ] o impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual lead-
ers in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation .... Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." Id. at 250.
25. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
26. See generally id.
27. Id. at 262. Approximately 4500 copies of the newspaper were distributed to stu-
dents, school personnel, and community members that year. Id.
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id. at 267.
30. Id.
31. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. Substantial language in Tinker
supports free student speech in public schools:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students .... They
are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect .... They may
not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.
In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate
their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.
393 U.S. at 511. Famously, the Tinker opinion goes on to state:
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to school curricula. 32 Unlike the armbands in Tinker, the court in Ha-
zelwood found that the student articles were written for their journal-
ism class and were school-sponsored speech within the curriculum,
which the court found was not a public forum. 33
After concluding that the high school paper constituted a non-
public forum, the Hazelwood court further held that "educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive ac-
tivities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. '34 The Court deferred to the principal's stated
reasons for the censorship finding that there were legitimate pedagog-
ical concerns, including lack of time to make changes, protecting
younger students from references to sexual activity, and avoiding of-
fending parents. 3 5 Significantly, the majority stated in a footnote that
"[w]e need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is
appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at
the college and university level." 36
B. Circuit Court Cases After Hazelwood and Before Hosty
In Hazelwood, the United States Supreme Court focused on
whether the high school newspaper operated in a public forum and
reasoned that secondary students in public schools do not automati-
cally enjoy rights "coextensive with the rights of adults in other set-
tings."3 7 Because of its limited scope, circuit courts have been
reluctant to apply Hazelwood to college speech or to speech that is part
of a limited or designated public forum when determining whether
school officials' restraints on student speech are constitutionally
permissible.38
Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so
circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression
would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevo-
lent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.
Id. at 513.
32. Hazlewood, 484 U.S. at 270-73. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
33. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
34. Id. at 273. The First Amendment would be implicated when the censorship of a
school-sponsored publication had "no valid educational purpose." Id.
35. Id. at 263-64, 273.
36. Id. at 273 n.7.
37. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
38. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding Hazelwood inap-
plicable to a college speech dispute over a college yearbook because (1) Hazelwood dealt
with a high school setting, and (2) the yearbook was part of a limited public forum, as
opposed to the non-public forum the Hazelwood newspaper operated in); Student Gov't
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Both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have applied Hazelwood to
college speech disputes, 39 and both circuits held that the school pro-
grams implicated in those cases were nonpublic fora-similar to the
Hazelwood newspaper-rather than traditional public fora.40 Although
these cases are troubling for their willingness to apply Hazelwood to
college speech, the Tenth and Eleventh confined the extension of Ha-
zelwood to curricular speech. 41 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has applied
Hazelwood to a First Amendment claim for censorship of a graduate
student's thesis. 42 In Brown v. Li, the court held that there was no First
Amendment violation because the student's thesis was required as
part of the master's program and was subject to "reasonable regula-
tion" under the Hazelwood standard for regulation of curricular stu-
dent speech. 43
As these Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit cases demonstrate,
no circuit court decision before Hosty v. Cartey44 has applied Hazelwood
to extracurricular speech-speech occurring in limited or traditional
public fora.45
C. Hosty v. Carter and Its Inappropriate Application of Hazelwood
to the College Marketplace of Ideas
In Hosty, three students from Governors State University46 filed a
suit for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Governors State
University and several officials and administrators. 47 The students
were editors and reporters for The Innovator, the student-run bi-
Ass'n v. Bd. of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating Hazelwood "is not
applicable to college newspapers").
39. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004); Bishop v. Aro-
nov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071, 1073-74 (l1th Cir. 1991).
40. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285; Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071.
41. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285; Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074.
42. See Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2002).
43. Id. at 952.
44. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 743 (7th Cir. 2005) (Evans, J., dissenting) ("The
decisions the majority cites in support of its position [applying Hazelwood to the facts of
Hosty], moreover, are inapplicable. Bishop v. Aranov and Axson-Flynn v. Johnson both con-
cerned free speech rights within the classroom.") (internal citations omitted); Virginia J.
Nimick, Note, Schoolhouse Rocked: Hosty v. Carter and the Case Against Hazelwood, 14J. L. &
POL'Y 941, 943 (2006) ("Hazelwoods application in Hosty place[s] the Seventh Circuit in
direct conflict with its sister Circuits . .
45. See Hosty, 412 F.3d at 743.
46. Governors State University is located in Illinois in the Seventh Circuit. See Gover-
nors State University, http://www.govst.edu/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). In Judge Easter-
brook's merciless opinion, he pokes fun at the ungrammatical title of the school, which
lacks a possessive apostrophe in the word "Governors." Id. at 732 (majority opinion).
47. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 733.
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monthly newspaper at Governors State University, which served as
"'the main source of information about campus life."' 48 The suit
arose after one of the plaintiffs published an article in The Innovator
"attack[ing] the integrity" of Dean Roger K Oden, the Dean of the
College of Arts and Sciences at Governors State. 49 University officials
took offense, claiming the article contained factual inaccuracies. 50
However, The Innovator refused to retract the article or print the ad-
ministration's position. 51 Several administrators then "issued state-
ments accusing The Innovator of irresponsible and defamatory
journalism. 15 2 Dean Patricia Carter, Dean of Student Affairs and Ser-
vices, subsequently told The Innovator's printer not to publish anything
that she had not approved in advance. 53 Staff at The Innovator refused
to submit issues for prior approval, and the printer was unwilling to
risk not getting paid. 54 The newspaper only resumed publishing after
new management replaced the plaintiffs. 55
The defendants, including Dean Carter, argued they were enti-
tled to qualified immunity.56 The district court granted qualified im-
munity to all defendants except Dean Carter. 57  On Carter's
interlocutory appeal of her qualified immunity claim, a panel of the
48. Nimick, supra note 44, at 968-69.
49. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 732-33.
50. Id.; Margaret L. Hosty, De LaForcade's Contract Dispute Reaches 3rd Phase Arbitration,
INNOVATOR, Oct. 31, 2000, at 1, available at www.splc.org/pdf/innovator.pdf. The Student
Press Law Center opined that De Laforcade
believes Carter halted printing because the Oct. 31 issue angered the administra-
tion. Hosty, managing editor of The Innovator, wrote an article for that issue about
a grievance De LaForcade had filed against the University regarding his dismissal.
In the same issue, a letter to the editor by De Laforcade appeared, which he says
was unrelated to his complaint and was written before he knew that Hosty had
written about the incident for that issue.
Editors Sue University for First Amendment Violations, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER, Mar. 30, 2001,
at 1, http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=259&year=2001.
51. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 733.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. According to the district court, plaintiffs additionally alleged that after the
disputed article was published, there were break-ins to The Innovator's office, the locks were
changed but the students were not provided with keys for access for weeks, and both the
plaintiffs' mail and the plaintiffs' e-mail messages were "tampered with" and thrown away
or deleted. Hosty v. Carter, No. 01C500, 2001 WL 1465621, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2001), affid, 325
F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2003), vacated by 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs could not
support some of these assertions with evidence linking the defendants to the alleged
wrongdoing. Id.
56. Hosty, 2001 WrL 1465621, at *5.
57. See id. at *5. Those defendants who had no connection to the censorship were
dismissed, and others received qualified immunity. Id. at *5-*7. The district court also
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial
of qualified immunity. 58 However, the Seventh Circuit granted
Carter's petition for rehearing en banc5 9 and eventually reversed the
district court's ruling in a 7-4 decision.60 Two of the judges who par-
ticipated in the three judge panel decision dissented to the en banc
reversal.
6 1
The en banc opinion began its analysis with Hazelwood and found
that the Supreme Court did not limit Hazelwoods holding to high
school speech. 62 Hosty reasoned that age is only relevant when the jus-
tification for restriction of speech depends on the maturity of the au-
dience. 63 The court argued that "there is no sharp difference between
high school and college papers" when the school officials' alleged jus-
tification for censorship depends on other factors such as "high stan-
dards" and "dissociating the school" from strong positions. 64 Rejecting
the district court's holding that "Hazelwood is inapplicable to university
newspapers," the court held that Hazelwood applies to "student news-
papers at colleges as well as elementary and secondary schools."6 5 Af-
ter Hosty adopted the Hazelwood framework, the court concluded The
Innovator did not operate in a traditional public forum, but partici-
pated in a designated or limited public forum. 6
6
Turning to qualified immunity, the en banc court held that a rea-
sonable person in Dean Carter's position would not necessarily know
rejected the defendant's contention that Hazelwood applied because The Innovator was an
.autonomous student organization," "not part of a class." Id. at *7.
58. Hosty, 325 F.3d 950.
59. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 733.
60. Id. at 732, 739.
61. Judges Rovner and Evans participated in both the panel decision and the en banc
dissent. Id. at 739 (Evans, J., dissenting); Hosty, 325 F.3d at 946.
62. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 735 (quoting Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988)).
65. Id. at 734-35. The court also relied on the aforementioned Tenth and Eleventh
Circuit decisions, which applied Hazelwood to curricular college speech in a non-public
forum. Id. at 735. However, unlike those cases, the Hosty court concluded that The Innovator
operated in a designated public forum "where the editors were empowered to make their
own decisions." Id. at 737-38. The court reached this conclusion because of the requisite
deference towards plaintiffs on summary judgment motions. Id. at 738. This reasoning is
contrary to a Sixth Circuit decision rejecting Hazelwood's application and holding that a
student yearbook operated in a limited public forum. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342,
346 (6th Cir. 2000); supra note 37 and accompanying text.
66. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737. In contrast, Hazelwood held the high school newspaper in
that case was part of a non-public forum. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71. Yet, the Su-
preme Court in Hazelwood allowed the high school principal to exercise "greater control"
over the newspaper precisely because it was part of the school curriculum. Id. at 271-72.
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that a demand to review the paper before paying the printer violated
the First Amendment. 67 Thus, the court found that Dean Carter was
eligible for qualified immunity, shielding her from damages liability.68
After five years of litigation, the censored plaintiffs received no vindi-
cation of their rights. The United States Supreme Court denied their
petition for certiorari on February 21, 2006.69
Despite Hosty's application of Hazelwood to college speech in a
designated public forum, there are several legal arguments that sup-
port restricting Hazelwood to the high school realm.70 First, policy con-
siderations weigh against Hazelwoodas infiltration of the college
campus. Hazelwood's unfriendly treatment of high school students'
speech in a curricular newspaper was grounded in a generally re-
duced recognition of rights for high school students.71 There are
many differences between college and high school students-includ-
ing age, experience, level of responsibility, and environment-indicat-
ing that the two groups should be treated differently. 72 Probing these
differences, Judge Easterbrook expresses doubt about the maturity of
college students as a whole: "Not that any line could be bright; many
high school seniors are older than some college freshmen, and junior
67. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739. This holding ignores the simple fact that the printer's
owner and president warned Dean Carter that her demand for prior review was likely un-
constitutional. See No. 01C500, 2001 WL 1465621, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2001), affd, 325 F.3d 945,
950 (7th Cir. 2003), vacated by 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005); Finnigan, Jr., supra note 5, at
1477.
68. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739.
69. 546 U.S. 1169 (2006).
70. Commentators have noted that Hosty's use of the Hazelwood standard in a college
setting defies the language of Hazelwood and contradicts other Supreme Court and circuit
court precedent. See, e.g., Finnigan,Jr., supra note 5, at 1491 ("The en banc court's reliance
on Hazelwood resulted from a fairly strained reading of that opinion, as well as a blatant
manipulation of that case's holding .... ); Jessica B. Lyons, Note, Defining Freedom of the
College Press After Hosty v. Carter, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1771, 1785-86 (2006); Nimick, supra
note 44, at 193; Chris Sanders, Comment, Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the
Preservation of Free Speech at Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159, 170 (2006); see also
Daniel Applegate, Note, Stop the Presses: The Impact of Hosty v. Carter and Pitt News v. Pap-
pert on the Editorial Freedom of College Newspapers, 56 CASE W. L. REV. 247, 273 (2005) ("Ex-
tending Hazelwood to college newspapers would strip college newspapers of their editorial
freedom and autonomy and simply turn them into a branch or appendage of the
college.").
71. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1988); Hosty, 412 F.3d at
740-41.
72. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 70, at 264-71 (discussing crucial differences be-
tween high school and college students, including the greater maturity of college students,
the fact that they are older, and the freedoms of college life); Finnigan,Jr., supra note 5, at
1495 ("Having reached the age of majority, adult college students enjoy many rights under
the law that minors do not. Only by downplaying these important distinctions does the
majority in Hosty arrive at its result.").
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colleges are similar to many high schools. ' 73 He then goes on to state
that "there is no sharp difference between high school and college
papers" in upholding high standards, ensuring that speech is gram-
matical, and verifying that the school is not associated with controver-
sial positions.7 4
In vehement disagreement, the Hosty dissent gave two reasons for
the law's differential treatment of high school and college students.
First, it noted that "high school students are less mature and the mis-
sions of the respective institutions are different. These differences
make it clear that Hazelwood does not apply beyond high school .... 
75
Second, the dissent argued, "the missions" of high school and college
institutions "are quite different."76 While secondary schools are re-
sponsible for students' well being and education, the main mission of
a university is "to expose students to a 'marketplace of ideas.' 77 Uni-
versities serve a unique role in fostering free expression. As one com-
mentator notes: "The need for a viable marketplace of ideas is the
underlying principle of most First Amendment protections, both
within the university and the greater community.... Courts have con-
sistently recognized the special role of the university as a marketplace
of ideas deserving special constitutional protection." 78 By granting too
much deference to administrative regulation of college students'
speech, a university's goals in promoting creative thought and curious
inquiry may be stifled. 79
In applying Hazelwood to a dispute over the free expression of col-
lege students, Hosty disregarded other circuit court decisions and dis-
torted Hazelwoods reasoning.80 While logically unsound, Hosty is also
troubling from a policy perspective. Even though the case is not bind-
ing authority in most states, it nonetheless provides a chisel to those
who would chip away at college students' rights to publish their ideas
73. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734.
74. Id. at 735.
75. Id. at 740 (Evans, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 741.
77. Id. at 741 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)); see also Mayor,
California, supra note 4, at 1.
78. Lyons, supra note 70, at 1794.
79. "[l]ntellectual curiosity of students remains today a central determination of a
university's success and asserting that restriction of that curiosity 'risks the suppression of
free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life,
its college and university campuses."' Hosty, 412 F.3d at 741 (EvansJ, dissenting) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995)).
80. See, e.g., Finnigan, Jr., supra note 5, at 1491 (arguing Hosty displayed "a complete
disregard for all cases prior to Hazelwood specifically addressing student newspapers in a
university setting").
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free of administrative oversight and review.8 ' Hazelwoods devastating
impact on high school students' newspapers might be replicated on
college campuses with Hosty. After Hazelwood, high school principals
had "nearly unbridled discretion" to control student media.8 2 In his
dissent to the en banc decision, CircuitJudge Evans noted that " [t] he
majority's holding.., is particularly unfortunate considering the man-
ner in which Hazelwood has been used in the high school setting to
restrict controversial speech." 83
As the Hosty dissent observed, high school administrators exer-
cised their prerogative to censor student speech in increasing num-
bers after Hazelwood.8 4 In 2002, the Student Press Law Center 85
recorded 529 censorship-related calls from high school students, a
240% increase since 1996.86 Unfortunately, this increase in student
reports of censorship corresponds to an increase in judicial tolerance
of high school censorship. The Ninth, Seventh, and Sixth circuits have
all upheld the reasonableness of primary and secondary school offi-
cials' decisions to restrict speech after Hazelwood.8 7 With Hosty, Hazel-
81. A school wishing to infringe these rights merely needs to establish regularized
content review and approval for pedagogical purposes before rewriting student articles.
Indeed, the general counsel for CSU noted that while Hosty is "only applicable in three
Midwestern states," it potentially provides "more latitude" for administrative censorship of
subsidized student papers. See Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
82. See Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free Expression
on Public Campuses, Lessons from the "College Hazelwood" Case, 68 TENN. L. REv. 481, 533
(2001) (asserting college administrators will not differ from high school administrators
who "took advantage of their expansive powers" under Hazelwood to "convert the student
publications to student public relations") (emphasis added); see also MarkJ. Fiore, Comment,
Trampling the "Marketplace of Ideas": The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College Cam-
puses, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1915, 1929-30 ("As a result of the Hazelwood decision, secondary
schools have censored student speech far more rampantly in the past decade than in previ-
ous years.").
83. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 742 (Evans, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. The Student Press Law Center "is an advocate for student free-press rights and
provides information, advice, and legal assistance at no charge to students and the educa-
tors who work with them." Student Press Law Center, http://www.splc.org/ (last visited
Apr. 16, 2007).
86. Nimick, supra note 44, at 957.
87. See Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1994) (approv-
ing elementary school principal's decision to prohibit student from wearing shirts with
certain messages); Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829-30
(9th Cir. 1991) (upholding reasonableness of school district's decision to prohibit family
planning advertisements in high school newspapers under Hazelwood); Poling v. Murphy,
872 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding high school administration's exclusion of
student from student council elections because of student's speech).
Spring 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
woods chilling impact on high school speech also looms over the
college marketplace of ideas. 88
II. California Assembly Bill 2581, the Leonard Law, and
Antebi v. Occidental
A. A.B. 2581: California's Response to Hosty v. Carter
California Senator Leland Yee introduced A.B. 2581 on February
24, 200689 in response to a memo written by CSU General Counsel
Christine Helwick. 90 Helwick's memo advised the CSU presidents that
their universities could benefit from Hosty: "[T] he case appears to sig-
nal that CSU campuses may have more latitude than previously be-
lieved to censor the content of subsidized student newspapers,
provided that there is an established practice of regularized content
review and approval for pedagogical purposes."91 Jim Ewert, legal
counsel for the California Newspaper Publishers Association, stated
mildly that " [Helwick's] memo raised some concerns amongst student
88. Muted campus speech and professional journalism are plausible results of Hosty.
Prior to Hosty, a Sixth Circuit panel applied the Hazelwood framework to a college speech
dispute. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, (6th Cir. 1999), vacated by 236 F.3d 342 (6th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the panel's application of
Hazelwood to the college setting. Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 346, 346 n.5. However, before the
Kincaid en banc decision, commentators predicted that Hazelwood would chill college stu-
dents' speech. See Peltz, supra note 82, at 533 ("[T]here is no reason to expect college
administrators ... to respond differently from how high school administrators responded
to Hazelwood. To the extent that high school administrators took advantage of their expan-
sive powers to convert the student publications to student public relations on 'pedagogical'
grounds, one should expect no less, or no more, from college administrators, who are
embroiled in the intensely competitive business of higher education."); Fiore, supra note
82, at 1916 ("Were the Hazelwood standard applied to public colleges and universities, the
federal courts would drastically deviate from their long-standing tradition of recognizing
the nation's campuses as a 'marketplace of ideas.'"). Similarly, the dissent in Hosty ex-
pressed its displeasure that "as a result of today's holding, Dean Carter could have cen-
sored the Innovator by merely establishing 'legitimate pedagogical reasons.' This court now
gives the green light to school administrators to restrict student speech in a manner incon-
sistent with the First Amendment." 412 F.3d at 742 (Evans, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
89. Complete Bill History, A.B. No. 2581, http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/
asm/ab2551-2600/ab_2581_bill_20060828_history.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). Yee
was a California Assembly Member when he introduced A.B. 2581. See Senator Leland Yee,
California State Senate, http://dist08.casen.govoffice.com/ (click biography link) (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2007); Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1 (stating the bill's sponsor was "as-
semblyman Leland Yee").
90. See Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
91. See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1. Hosty, a Seventh Circuit decision, is only
persuasive authority in California, which is part of the Ninth Circuit. Nevertheless, Helwick
brought Hosty to the attention of the leaders of the California State University system. Id.
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press advocates."9 2 In a university system with over 400,000 students,
Helwick's memo implied potential censorship of staggering numbers
of college students in California. 3
A.B. 2581 amended California Education Code section 66301 to
prohibit administrators, as well as regents, board members, and trust-
ees of California's colleges and universities from censoring students
for speech that would be protected by the Federal and California Con-
stitutions outside the campus. 94 After a series of slight revisions, A.B.
2581 was passed by the state senate by a vote of 31-2 on August 10,
200695 and signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on August
28, 2006.96 The bill inserted the following new provision into Califor-
nia Education Code section 66301 (a):
Existing law prohibits the Regents of the University of California,
upon their adoption of a specified resolution, and the Trustees of
the California State University and the governing board of a com-
munity college district, from making or enforcing any rule subject-
ing a student to disciplinary sanction solely on the basis of conduct
that is speech or other communication that, when engaged in
outside a campus is protected from governmental restriction by
specified provisions of the California Constitution or the United
States Constitution.... This bill would additionally prohibit any
92. See Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
93. "With 24 campuses and more than 400,000 students, the California State Univer-
sity system is the largest in the country." Evan Mayor, Memo Linking California with Hosty
Decision Worries Students, STUDENT PREss L. CENTER, Sept. 15, 2005, at 1, http://www.splc.
org/printpage.asp?id=1064&tb=newsflash [hereinafter Mayor, Memo].
94. See Assemb. B. 2581, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301
(West Supp. 2007). This "speech friendly" legislation is an apt response by the state with
more college students and more colleges and universities than any other state in the
United States. The California community college system has "more than 2.5 million mostly
part-time students" and "describes itself as the largest postsecondary education system in
the world." Ria Sengupta & ChristopherJepsen, California's Community College Students, Cali-
fornia Counts: Population Trends and Profiles, PUB. POL'Y INST. CAL., Nov. 2006, at 1, www.
ppic.org/content/pubs/cacounts/cc-1lO6RSCC.pdf. As of 2005, California had 399 de-
gree-granting institutions, compared to New York, the state with the second highest num-
ber, which had 307. Digest of Education Statistics Tables and Figures, Table 244, 2005,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dtO5-244.asp [hereinafter Table 244].
Of those 399 degree-granting institutions, 255 were private. See id. Comparing enrollment
figures, as of Fall 2002, California had 2,474,024 students enrolled in degree-granting insti-
tutions, and the state with the second highest enrollment figures, Texas, had 1,152,369
students enrolled. Thus, in 2002, California had more than one million more students
enrolled in its higher education institutions than any other state. Digest of Education Sta-
tistics, Ch. 3 Postsecondary Education, Table 189, 2004, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/di-
gest/d04/tables/dt04-l89.asp.
95. See Assembly Bill 2581 History, Assemb. B. No. 2581, Ch. 158, available at http://
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_2551-2600/ab_2581bill_20060828_chaptered.
pdf; see also Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
96. See id.
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administrator of any campus of those institutions from making or enforcing
any rule subjecting a student to disciplinary sanction .... 9
Following this new provision of subdivision (a), subdivision (b)
provides specific remedies for students subject to disciplinary sanc-
tions as a result of their speech:
Any student enrolled in an institution, as specified in subdividision
(a), that has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdivision
(a) may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate injunctive
and declaratory relief as determined by the court. Upon a motion,
a court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. . . .98
Reading the above language in isolation from other California
law, A.B. 2581 appears to protect college students in California from a
Hosty reenactment by prohibiting college administrators from disci-
plining students for their speech. However, section 66301, as
amended by A.B. 2581, only protects public college students in Califor-
nia from administrative censorship. 99 The newly amended statute
states that "[n] either the Regents of the University of California, the
Trustees of the California State University, the governing board of any
community college district, nor any administrator of any campus of
those institutions, shall make or enforce any rule . . -100 Thus, the
speech protections provided in section 66301 only apply to students at
state colleges and universities. An assessment of college students'
speech protections in California should include private college stu-
dents, who also participate in expressive activities. 10 1 Since students at
private universities in California cannot invoke section 66301 when
97. Id. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301(a) (West Supp. 2007).
98. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301(b). Section 66301 only applies to public college stu-
dents in California. Private college students must invoke the Leonard Law to bring suit
against their administrators. See discussion infra Part III.A.
99. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301(a), (b); supra note 96 and accompanying text.
100. See id. § 66301 (a).
101. See, e.g., Brian J. Steffen, Freedom of the Private University Student Press: A Constitu-
tional Proposal, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 139, 142 (2003) ("The rights of private university
student journalists have always been considered in comparison with their counterparts at
public institutions, and any evisceration of press rights at public universities would doubt-
lessly embolden officials of at least some private universities to tighten their control over
student publications."). Steffen argues that "the differences between public and private
universities have diminished as public higher education has grown in size and influence."
Id. at 149. He also asserts "[t]here is little evidence that prospective students seek out pri-
vate higher education in order to be insulated from ideas." Id. at 150.
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their free speech rights are trampled, 102 they must turn to other stat-
utes or case law.103
B. The Leonard Law: California's Unique Statutory Protection for
Private College Students' Expression
The First Amendment provides a measure of protection to public
college students' speech, publications, and other expression. 10 4 How-
ever, "most courts have refused to find a sufficient connection be-
tween the state and private educational institutions to make First
Amendment guarantees binding on private schools." 105 Since the First
Amendment does not reach private college students, states may pro-
tect private college speech through their constitutions or statutes.10 6
California appears to be the only state to have done so. 10 7
In 1992, California Senator Bill Leonard a08 drafted a law requir-
ing private colleges and universities in California to abide by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as article I, sec-
tion 2 of the California Constitution. 0 9 "The Leonard Law, named for
102. "The SPLC has noted that '[O] fficial control of studentjournalists at many private
schools remains a legal and practical reality."' Id. at 170. According to Steffen, the Student
Press Law Center received "321 complaints from university student journalists about cen-
sorship by college officials in 1991," though that number "does not differentiate" between
public and private universities. Id. at 142.
103. Steffen critiques the effectiveness of various methods for protecting student
speech at private universities, including legal theories asserted in case law and statutes. See
generally id. However, another critic endorses statutes as superior "method[s] to vouchsafe"
freedom of expression on college campuses. Sanders, supra note 70, at 173.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Steffen, supra note 101, at 140.
105. Id. at 158.
106. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002).
107. "California's so-called 'Leonard Law', named for the state legislator who
shepherded the bill through the State Assembly, is the only state law to date specifically
intended to protect speech and press rights on private campuses that courts have upheld as
constitutional." Steffen, supra note 101, at 168. See also Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995) (order granting preliminary injunction)
("[I]t does not appear that any other state has enacted a statute similar to Education Code
§ 94367 . . . ).
108. Bill Leonard, a Republican, served the California state legislature for twenty-four
years, and served as Assembly Republican Leader in 1998. See Bill Leonard, Board of Equal-
ization, Dist. 2, http://www.billleonard.org/bio.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
109. CAL. EBUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002). The law was enacted in response to the
proliferation of college hate speech codes. SeeJon B. Gould, The Precedent that Wasn't: Col-
lege Hate Speech Codes and the Two Faces of Legal Compliance, 35 LAw & Soc'y REv. 345, 354 n.6
(2001). The relevant portion of article I, section 2, of the California Constitution states:
"(a) Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
speech or press." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2(a). The Leonard Law is unique in that private
college students in other states do not enjoy similar protection under the First Amend-
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its sponsor, Bill Leonard, is unusual among states and was adopted in
direct response to the rise of college hate speech codes.""l l0 The Leo-
nard Law specifically prohibits private, postsecondary educational in-
stitutions from disciplining students for expressive activity that would
be protected by the First Amendment outside of the institution:
No private postsecondary education institution shall make or en-
force any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions
solely on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communica-
tion that, when engaged in outside the campus or facility of a pri-
vate postsecondary institution, is protected from governmental
restriction by the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion or Section 2 of Article 1 of the California Constitution. 1 '
Senator Leonard also put teeth into the law by allowing private
students to file civil suits for injunctive and declaratory relief and al-
lowing for recovery of attorney's fees. 1 2 This provision mostly mirrors
that of California Education Code section 66301, excerpted above:
Any student enrolled in a private postsecondary educational insti-
tution that has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdivi-
sion (a) may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate
injunctive and declaratory relief as determined by the court. Upon
motion, a court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff
in a civil action pursuant to this section. 113
In Cony v. Leland Stanford Junior University,' 14 the first case filed
under the Leonard Law, the Santa Clara Superior Court invalidated
Stanford University's speech code' 15 for being overbroad and contain-
ing impermissible content-based restrictions and simultaneously up-
held the constitutionality of the Leonard Law.11 6 Even though the
ment. See Steffen, supra note 101, at 168. A federal law was proposed in 1991 "that would
have granted injunctive and declaratory relief to students and faculty at some private col-
leges who believed that campus speech policies infringed on their First Amendment rights
.... Unlike the Leonard Law, however, the Hyde legislation never emerged from commit-
tee." Id. at 169.
110 Gould, supra note 109, at 354 n.6.
111. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a).
112. Id. § 94367(b).
113. Id.
114. No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Feb. 27, 1995) (order granting preliminary injunction),
available at http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/cduncan/265/corryvstanford.htm.
115. The speech code prohibited discriminatory harassment and attempted to define
it. Part of the definition included use of "insulting or 'fighting' words" and prohibited
"'discriminatory intimidation by threats of violence and also includes personal vilification
of students on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
national and ethnic origin.'" Id. at 1 (internal numbering). The court enjoined the speech
code because it went beyond fighting words to prohibit insults and "offensive speech." Id.
at 41-42.
116. Id. at 24, 41-42. The court held Stanford's speech code was overbroad and
"clearly punishe[d] students for words which may not cause an imminent breach of the
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Leonard Law was off to a successful start, its tenure has been quiet
since Cony.1l 7
C. Antebi v. Occidental: New Limits on the Leonard Law
Despite the Leonard Law's triumph over constitutional chal-
lenges in Cony, the California Court of Appeal in Antebi v. Occidental
College18 recently limited the Leonard Law's reach. During the spring
2004 semester, Jason Antebi, a senior at Occidental College,' 19 held a
"shockjock" radio show consisting of "political satire, parody, provoca-
tive humor, and mockery" of anyone and everyone. 120 Antebi's com-
mentary on the show, as well as politically controversial decisions he
made as a member of the student council, angered other students.121
Three students published statements deriding his character, and
Antebi responded with provocative remarks. 122
The dispute escalated when the three students filed sexual harass-
ment complaints against Antebi, and the dean of students "removed
Antebi from the show."' 23 Sandra Cooper, general counsel for Occi-
dental, yelled at Antebi in a public hallway, calling him a "'racist,'
'sexist,' 'misogynist,' 'anti-Semite,' 'homophobe,' 'unethical[,]' and
'immoral trash."'124 Occidental's Title IX officer investigated the com-
peace . . . ." Id. at 8. The court also ruled that the speech code was an impermissible
content-based restriction. Id. at 10-11. See supra note 114.
117. Corry v. Stanford and Antebi v. Occidental are the only cases of record filed under the
Leonard Law. It could be argued that the Leonard Law has served its purpose by thwarting
Stanford's broad content-based hate speech code, thereby deterring private institutions
from censoring students, either individually or through broad policies. See Gould, supra
note 109, at 354.
118. 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 280 (Ct. App. 2006).
119. Occidental College is a private school in California. Id. at 278.
120. Id.
121. Id. See Opening Brief for Appellant at *2, Antebi v. Occidental Coll., 47 Cal. Rptr.
3d 277 (Ct. App. 2006) (No. 186951) [hereinafter Opening Brief].
122. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 278. Antebi claimed he was harassed and defamed by
other students and asserted that he attempted to file harassment complaints with the ad-
ministration, but was told to "'fight [his] own battles.'' See Opening Brief, supra note 121,
at *3.
123. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 278.
124. Id. The Court of Appeal allowed Antebi to continue with his claim against Cooper
for defamation. Id. at 280-81. While the court does not present Antebi's speech in a
favorable light, "[t]here is compelling evidence that the college misrepresented facts-
including baselessly accusing Antebi of crimes like vandalism and stalking-in order to
dissuade civil liberties groups from coming to his aid and used the incident as an excuse to
dissolve the troublesome student government." Lukianoff, supra note 21, at 1. See also
Opening Brief, supra note 121, at *3-*4 (alleging Occidental administrators told Antebi to
take care of his own complaints against other students, but noting that the same authorities
took up other students' complaints about Antebi).
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plaints as well as additional allegations against Antebi. t 25 The officer
also suggested that the school have Antebi apologize to the three stu-
dents and recommended counseling. 126 When Antebi refused to apol-
ogize, the associate dean ordered "disciplinary censure" until the end
of the semester, when Antebi would graduate. 127
In March 2005, Antebi filed a lawsuit based on eight separate
causes of action 2 -including the Leonard Law-in California supe-
rior court against Occidental, its Board of Trustees, and Occidental's
Director of Communications.1 29 The trial court dismissed Antebi's
case without leave to amend because Antebi did not exhaust internal
remedies and his only remedy was administrative mandamus. 130 On
appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling
on separate grounds.1 3' The Court of Appeal found that only cur-
rently-enrolled students could bring suit under the Leonard Law.132
Because Antebi was not a currently-enrolled student, the court held
that he lacked standing to bring his Leonard Law claim.13 3 Antebi's
lawyers filed a brief with the California Supreme Court seeking review
of the decision. 34 On October 25, 2006, the California Supreme
125. Id. Some students alleged that Antebi "threatened physical violence and retribu-
tion in emails to the gay community, and that he had defaced brochures with terms derog-
atory towards women." Id.
126. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 279.
127. Id.
128. The relevant cause of action for this Comment is "(7) declaratory relief under
California's Leonard law." Id. The Leonard Law protects "speech or other communica-
tion." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a) (West 2002).
129. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 279.
130. Id. Specifically, the district court dismissed the case due to Antebi's failure to ex-
haust the college's administrative remedies, including administrative mandamus. Id.; CAL.
CODE CiV. PROC. § 1094.5 (West 1980).
131. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 279-80.
132. Id. The court cited section 94367(b), which provides: "Any student enrolled in a
private postsecondary institution that has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdivi-
sion (a) may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate injunctive and declaratory
relief. .. ." CAL. EDuc. CODE § 94367(b).
133. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
134. See Marnette Federis, Lawyers for Former Occidental Shock Jock Ask California Supreme
Court for Review: Lower Court Ruled Antebi Could Not Sue Under Leonard Law, STUDENT PRESS L.
CENTER, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1339&year--. According to
Greg Lukianoff, the president of The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education,
which assisted Antebi's case, "'The court of appeal's interpretation of the Leonard Law
completely eviscerates what the law is trying to do."' Id. California Education Code section
66301, which provides speech protection to public college students in California, has simi-
lar language to the Leonard Law. See CA.. Enuc. CODE § 66301 (a)-(b) (West Supp. 2007).
If Antebi had been a public college student in California, he might have been subject to
the same standing limitation under section 66301. See infra discussion Part III.B.
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Court denied Antebi's petition for review and depublication
request. 135
III. Administrators Escape Liability Under the Leonard Law,
and Antebi Threatens the Leonard Law and Section
66301
A. The Leonard Law Does Not Allow Private College Students to
Sue Administrators Directly
Section 66301, as amended by A.B. 2581, is an essential step to-
ward fostering free expression in public colleges in California. As a
result of A.B. 2581, public university administrators, in addition to
trustees, regents, and directors, are prohibited from imposing discipli-
nary sanctions on college students for their speech. 136 However, sec-
tion 66301 does not go the full distance. It leaves students at private
institutions vulnerable to administrative censorship for their speech,
since the statute is only applicable to officials of public colleges and
universities in California.1 37
As a result, private college students in California must rely on the
Leonard Law if they are subject to disciplinary sanctions for their
speech. However, it is unclear whether private college students may
obtain relief directly from the administrators who impose disciplinary
sanctions on the students, such as Dean Carter's order to stop the
presses in Hosty,'38 because administrators are not mentioned in the
Leonard Law. The Leonard Law was originally passed with school
speech codes in mind-not the behavior of administrators.139 Like
section 66301, the Leonard Law is phrased as a prohibition on disci-
plinary sanctions imposed in retaliation for expressive activity. 140 Yet,
instead of prohibiting certain officials from censoring speech, the Le-
onard Law prohibits "private postsecondary educational institution[sf'
from imposing disciplinary sanctions for students' speech.1 4 1 Part (b)
states that the student may commence a civil action but does not say
135. 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14130, at *1 (Oct. 25, 2006).
136. See CAL. EDuc. CODE § 66301; Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
137. See§ 66301(a) ("(a) Neither the Regents of the University of California, the Trust-
ees of the California State University, the governing board of any community college dis-
trict, nor any administrator of any campus of those institutions .... ").
138. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 2005).
139. See Gould, supra note 109, at 354 n.6.
140. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 (a) ("Neither the Regents... nor any administra-
tor... shall make or enforce . . . .") with CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a) (West 2002) ("No
private postsecondary educational institution shall make or enforce.
141. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a) (emphasis added).
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who a student may sue.1 42 Subdivisions (c) through (f) are likewise
silent in this regard. 143
Noticeably lacking from the statute is an explanation of what or
whose actions constitute disciplinary sanctions by a "private postsecon-
dary institution. 1 44 Since the statute does not mention administrators
or other officials, courts may be reluctant to allow students to sue ad-
ministrators directly under the Leonard Law.1 45 If students cannot sue
administrators, they may need to link administrators' misconduct with
the university to preserve their Leonard Law claims. 146 A private uni-
versity sued under the Leonard Law could be held liable-if not di-
rectly, then through the doctrine of respondeat superior-for the
administrator's unconstitutional censorship. 147 Through respondeat
superior, students who bring Leonard Law claims may succeed in
holding private universities liable for administrators' censorship, even
if they cannot proceed directly against administrators. Unfortunately,
the Leonard Law will not deter administrators from censoring stu-
dents if students cannot include them in their suits. The administra-
tors will escape the negative consequences of litigation, including the
hassle of court appearances, the humiliation of a judicial rebuke for
wrongdoing, and public scrutiny of the administrator's decisions.
There are only two cases to refer to for guidance as to whether
private college students may bring Leonard Law claims directly
against private university administrators.1 48 Corny v. Stanford,14 9 the Le-
onard Law's test case, is not helpful because the students in that case
filed a general suit against Stanford University and three individual
142. See id. § 94367(b).
143. See id. § 94367(c)-(f).
144. Id. § 94367(a).
145. Id.
146. Employment law provides that an employer may be directly liable for the torts of
its employees because of the employer's negligent selection, training, or supervision. See 2
CAL. EMP. L. § 30.01 (2006). Additionally, the employer may be held vicariously liable, even
if not directly liable, for torts committed "within the scope of the tortfeaser's employment."
See id. § 30.05. However, the question arises as to whether a violation of the Leonard Law
gives rise to a tort. These considerations may complicate a student's Leonard Law claim
and detract focus from the actual perpetrator of the censorship-the administrator.
147. See id. § 30.05.
148. One commentator notes that as of Spring 2006, no appellate court decision exists
upholding "student press rights at private university institutions." See Nancy J. Whitmore,
Vicarious Liability and the Private University Student Press, 11 COMM. L. & POL'v 255, 262
(2006).
149. No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
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defendants. 50 The students sought a declaratory judgment that Stan-
ford's speech code was an unconstitutional, content-based restriction
on speech, as well as a violation of California's Leonard Law. 15' The
court treated all the defendants as one entity, and the defendants'
arguments addressed Stanford's speech code and the speech rights of
the institution, rather than individual liability concerns. 152 Because
the constitutionality of Stanford's speech code was at issue,' 53 rather
than individuals' actions, Cony did not address vicarious liability. In
Antebi, the California Court of Appeal did not object to the plaintiff's
suit against several university administrators. 15 4 However, since the
court found that Antebi lacked standing, 55 it did not determine
whether the administrators could be held individually liable under the
Leonard Law or whether the defendants were properly joined.
Thus, Cony and Antebi do not resolve the issue of whether the
Leonard Law encompasses administrative censorship of private col-
lege students' speech. Though students are not specifically precluded
from suing administrators under the Leonard Law, they may not be
able to proceed against administrators directly. If the administrators
cannot be held individually liable, they will not be deterred from disci-
plining students for controversial or troublesome speech. With so lit-
tle judicial guidance and the Leonard Law's vague language, private
college students in California would benefit from statutory language
specifically prohibiting administrators of private institutions from cen-
soring students.1 56
150. Stanford students brought suit against Stanford University, as well as ranking Stan-
ford administrators Sally Cole, Gerhard Casper, and John Freidenrich. See Register of Ac-
tions/Docket, Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309, http://www.sccaseinfo.
org/pa5.asp?full casenumber=1-94-CV-740309 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). However, the
caption of the opinion merely states, "The Leland Stanford Junior University, et al., De-
fendants," without enumeration. See Cony, No. 740309.
151. Cony, No. 740309, at 2, 3.
152. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 ("[I]t is Defendants' position that the Leonard Law would be
unconstitutional as applied to Defendants' speech code in a number of ways.").
153. See id.
154. Antebi v. Occidental Coll., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 279-80 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Antebi
brought this action in superior court against Occidental, its Board of Trustees, Ayala,
Harowitz, Mitchell, Cooper, Talesh, and James Trandquada, Occidental's director of com-
munications."). After dismissing Antebi's Leonard Law claim for lack of standing, the court
rejected the idea that the Board of Trustees of Occidental could be held liable in Antebi's
suit because "a director of a nonprofit corporation cannot be personally liable for the
debts, liabilities, or obligations of a corporation." Id. at 280.
155. See id. at 280.
156. The author and sponsor of A.B. 2581 added language to section 66301 prohibit-
ing administrators from censoring students, even though "existing law could be considered
sufficient to cover both administrators and the student press." See BILL ANALYSIS, supra note
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B. Antebi Cripples the Leonard Law and Subjects Private College
Students to the Risk of Expulsion for Their Speech
Antebi held that only currently-enrolled students may file suit
under the Leonard Law.15 7 The court decided that Antebi had to be
enrolled to bring a Leonard Law claim because: (1) based on the
"plain language" of section 94367(b), "the student must be enrolled
when the legal action begins"; (2) the legislature could have easily
included language such as "or who was enrolled," indicating the law is
meant to apply only to currently-enrolled students; and (3) the stand-
ing restriction is consistent with the remedies provided-injunctive
and declaratory relief-which the court argues will only benefit cur-
rent students.' 58
Each of Antebi's reasons in support of the current-enrollment re-
quirement can be refuted and are susceptible to challenges. First, in
contrast with the court's "plain language" reasoning, the statutory lan-
guage supports the conclusion that the person must have been en-
rolled as a student when the censorship occurred. Antebi took this
position.159 Opposing Antebi's argument, the court reasoned that
"the Legislature easily could have extended application of the statute
with the words 'any student enrolled or who was enrolled."160 Playing
the court's game, if the legislature had wanted prospective plaintiffs to
be enrolled when they brought suit under the Leonard Law, the legis-
lature could easily have stated, "Any student currently enrolled." It did
not.
Additionally, the language, "shall make or enforce any rule,"'' 61
merely links the enrollment to the time when a specific activity oc-
curred. "Enrolled" is a word with many possible time frames 162 that
4, at 1-2. Private college students would likewise benefit from a clear prohibition on admin-
istrative censorship in the Leonard Law.
157. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
158. Id. Education Code section 94367, subdivision (b) states: "Any student enrolled in
a private postsecondary institution that has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdi-
vision (a) may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate injunctive and declaratory
relief as determined by the court." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(b) (West 2002).
159. He asserted that "the language requires only that the student be enrolled at the
time of the unlawful act .... " Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
160. Id.
161. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a).
162. The following examples demonstrate the ambiguous nature of the word "en-
rolled" for establishing timing: "students who are currently enrolled should see me"; "stu-
dents who were enrolled beginning January 11th should see me"; "we both enrolled in the
class last spring"; "we enrolled in the course"; "students enrolled in the course" (this latter
phrase could mean students enrolled in the course now, or students who were enrolled
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changes meaning with specific descriptors. 6 " The court conveniently
uses descriptors consistent with its reading of current enrollment, 64
but the statute lacks such helpful words. 165 The word "enrolled" is the
same for past as well as present tense, and without helpful context, the
Leonard Law's current language also supports an "enrollment at the
time of censorship" reading. Thus, a plain reading of the statute does
not warrant the Antebi court's conclusion that the student must be en-
rolled at the time the suit is filed.
Second, the statute's goal, evidenced by the Leonard Law's plain
language, is to protect students from institutional censorship while
they are enrolled at private colleges and universities.1 66 The Antebi
court concluded that the current enrollment reading of the Leonard
Law "is consistent with the structure of the statute as a whole," and
that the statute's remedies-injunctive and declaratory relief-would
not be useful to non-students.1 67 Accepting Antebi's reasoning, if the
student must be currently enrolled when filing suit, must the student
have been continuously enrolled since the alleged sanction? What if
the student took a semester off after being censored and brought a
Leonard Law claim before returning to the private college?1 68 Antebi
does not address these scenarios and the Leonard Law does not con-
template detailed inquiries into the students' enrollment history. Con-
trary to the court's logic, the statute as a whole focuses on the
relationship between the parties when the censorship occurs, not on
the student's enrollment status after the sanctions are imposed. a69
Third, the court's conclusion that recent graduates will not bene-
fit from injunctive or declaratory relief is short-sighted.' 7 0 Non-stu-
dents may value the deterrent effect of a declaratory judgment and
feel vindicated by a court's determination that the university violated
previously). As these few examples demonstrate, the Antebi court's linguistic argument col-
lapses under scrutiny.
163. Clarifying words or phrases include: currently enrolled; enrolled at the time of,
who was enrolled; who is enrolled.
164. See Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
165. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(b).
166. See id. § 94367(a) ("No private postsecondary institution shall make or enforce any
rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions .... ); Steffen, supra note 101, at 168.
167. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
168. In this situation, the student would likely lack standing under Antebi's reasoning,
even though the student is temporarily not enrolled. Id. at 280.
169. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a) ("No private postsecondary educational institu-
tion shall make or enforce any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions . . .");
§ 94367(b) ("Any student enrolled in a private postsecondary institution that has made or
enforced any rule in violation of subdivision (a).
170. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
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their rights. It is also possible that the university's disciplinary sanction
will be a continual source of injury to the graduate, such as a black
mark on the student's record or removal of the student's written work
from academic circulation. 17' By focusing on whether a person is cur-
rently enrolled at the time the suit is filed, instead of whether the
person was a student when the censorship occurred, Antebi prevents
an entire group of censored students from vindicating their rights to
free expression.1 72 The status of the person at the time the suit is filed
is irrelevant, provided that the person was a student at the time the
alleged censorship was imposed. The harm does not evaporate when
the censored student graduates or leaves the institution.173
Antebi's holding is also troubling for the behavior that it encour-
ages. The case provides a roadmap for censorship of college
speech. 174 Greg Lukianoff, the president of the Foundation for Indi-
vidual Rights in Education, 175 explains one loophole that Antebi carves
into the Leonard Law: "[S]chools can avoid censorship lawsuits by
simply expelling the student before he or she can file a lawsuit
"1176
Lukianoff elaborates on another loophole, stating: "Under the
way that the court has interpreted [the law], a university would have
free reign to censor a student in the last semester of his senior year
almost as much as they'd like to ... ,,177 In this way, censorship could
occur in a student's final months or days before graduation, making it
171. See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to place grad-
uate student's masters thesis on file in library because of controversial "disacknowledg-
ments" section).
172. See Federis, supra note 134, at 1 ("'The court of appeal's interpretation of the
Leonard Law completely eviscerates what the law is trying to do."'). Cf Sternberg, supra
note 21, at I (quoting Lukianoff for the idea that Universities can expel students or censor
them in their last semesters "'also as much as they'd like to.'").
173. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 1795; see also Finnigan, Jr., supra note 5, at 1495 (criti-
cizing Hosty's result and asking, "[w]hen are people supposed to learn of their constitu-
tional rights? When barred from exercising them fully in high school and college, they will
be hard-pressed to learn how to be good journalists because they are being taught censor-
ship at every level of their development in the profession. Does the Seventh Circuit expect
them to graduate from college and magically realize that now it is acceptable to question
authority and government decisions?").
174. See Stemnberg, supra note 21, at 1; Opening Brief, supra note 121, at *27-*28 ("[I]f
two days before graduation a student gives a political speech that the administration does
not like, the administration can punish the student with impunity. And the Leonard Law,
which was designed to avoid just such an outcome, is powerless to stop it.").
175. Sternberg, supra note 21, at 1.
176. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79. Antebi refused to apologize to the other students
and was placed under "disciplinary censure" from May 14, 2004 to May 17, 2004. Id. at 279.
177. See id.
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difficult if not impossible for the student to appeal to the administra-
tion and ultimately file suit while still enrolled. 178 These loopholes al-
low university administrators to shred students' constitutional rights to
freedom of expression with impunity. If Antebi stands uncorrected,
private college students will be denied standing under the Leonard
Law if they commence a lawsuit so much as one day after they gradu-
ate or if they are expelled.
Lukianoff further derided Antebi's result, stating: "The court of
appeal's interpretation of the Leonard Law completely eviscerates
what the law is trying to do."179 According to Lukianoff, even Leonard
Law creator Bill Leonard "disagrees with the courts' interpreta-
tion."180 Similarly, the brief that Antebi's lawyers filed with the Califor-
nia Supreme Court contends that Antebi "reduced the scope of the
Leonard Law and the 'protections it was designed to provide.'"181
These concerns were also raised in a letter that The First Amendment
Project,18 2 Student Press Law Center, and the American Civil Liberties
Union of Northern California 8 3 sent to the California Supreme Court
on September 12, 2006.184 Unfortunately, the California Supreme
Court denied review as well as Antebi's depublication request. 8 5
By allowing Antebi to stand as good law, the California Supreme
Court ensures that other courts will consider Antebi when they hear
Leonard Law claims. Other courts may interpret the law differently,
but they will have to distinguish Antebi because it is currently the only
178. In Antebi, for example, Antebi was a senior when he was removed from his radio
show on March 11, 2004, and he did not file suit until March 2005. See id. at 278, 279
("Rameen Talesh, the associate dean of students ... ordered disciplinary censure" of
Antebi "until May 17, 2004.").
179. Federis, supra note 134, at 1.
180. Sternberg, supra note 21, at 1.
181. Federis, supra note 134, at 1. Both the trial and appellate courts denied Antebi
standing, but the trial court did so because it held Antebi was only entitled to review
through administrative mandamus. See Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
182. "The First Amendment Project is a nonprofit advocacy organization dedicated to
protecting and promoting freedom of information, expression, and petition." First Amend-
ment Project, FAP Mission, http://www.thefirstamendment.org/about.html (last visited
Apr. 8. 2007).
183. "The ACLU of Northern California works to preserve and guarantee the protec-
tions of the Constitution's Bill of Rights." ACLU of Northern California, Mission, http://
www.aclunc.org/about/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
184. See Sternberg, supra note 21, at 2.
185. See Antebi v. Occidental Coll., No. S146525, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14130, at *1 (Cal.
Oct. 25, 2006 Sup. Ct.).
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published case construing the Leonard Law. 186 In this way, Antebi's
standing limitations may cut out censored private college graduates
students or expelled students who would bring censorship complaints
under the Leonard Law.
C. Antebi's Standing Limitations Endanger the Free Speech Rights
of Public College Students
Antebi also places public colleges students at risk of eleventh-hour
censorship. Education Code section 66301, the statute that protects
public college students' free speech rights, and the Leonard Law
share nearly identical language in their remedial subdivisions.1 87 Sec-
tion 66301 (b) provides, "Any student enrolled in an institution, as
specified in subdivision (a), that has made or enforced any rule in
violation of subdivision (a) may commence a civil action to obtain ap-
propriate injunctive and declaratory relief. ..."188 Similarly, section
94367(b) provides, "Any student enrolled in a private postsecondary in-
stitution that has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdivision
(a) may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate injunctive and
declaratory relief .... 18 9 The Antebi court's conclusion that only cur-
renly-enrolled students have standing to bring Leonard Law claims
was based on the language of section 94367 subdivision (b).190 Since
section 94367(b) mirrors the language of section 66301 (b), California
courts could easily apply Antebi's current-enrollment requirement to
public college students bringing suit under section 66301 (b).
Due to these similarities between section 66301 (b) and the Leo-
nard Law, public college students are vulnerable to each of Antebi's
three language-based arguments for a current-enrollment require-
ment.19' A court construing the "any student enrolled in an institu-
tion" language of section 66301 (b) will likely be presented with
Antebis reasoning by defendants eager to have the case dismissed if
186. A search on "Leonard Law" or "94367" reveals that Cony, an unpublished Leonard
Law case preceding Antebi, is the only other Leonard Law case on record since the law was
passed in 1992. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002); see also discussion supra Part II.B.
187. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301(b) (West Supp. 2007) with CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 94367(b).
188. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301(b).
189. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(b) (emphasis added). The only difference between the
two statutes is that section 94367 subdivision (b) states "private postsecondary educational
institution," in the same place where section 66301 (a) enumerates "[n]either the Regents
. . . nor any administrator of any campus of those institutions." CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 66301 (a).
190. See Antebi v. Occidental Coll., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 280 (Ct. App. 2006).
191. Id. at 280; see also supra Part III.B.
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the section 66301 (b) plaintiff was no longer a student when he or she
filed suit. In such a case, a court would be hard-pressed to ignore
Antebi's interpretation of nearly identical language, since the case
stands as good law in California.
With A.B. 2581, the California Legislature bolstered section
66301 against the threat of Hosty just before the California Court of
Appeal issued its opinion in Antebi.1 92 Antebi deserves an equally strong
legislative response. Antebi not only undermines the Leonard Law's
protections for private college students but also lays the framework for
a court to read new standing limitations into the scope of section
66301. These potential standing restrictions may embolden public col-
lege administrators in California to impose disciplinary sanctions on
students immediately before they graduate. Additionally, administra-
tors may expel students to divest the school of troublesome ideas
while simultaneously depriving the former students of standing.193
With over 2,474,024 students enrolled in public and private higher
educational institutions in California, 194 Antebi provides free speech
advocates with cause for concern. Antebi's standing limitation dimin-
ishes opportunities for college students to hold school administrators
liable for unconstitutional censorship and potentially stifles the mar-
ketplace of ideas in California. If former students of both public and
private institutions lose the protections of the Leonard Law and sec-
tion 66301 due to this limitation, they may be forced to rely on the
Federal and California Constitution to vindicate their rights. 195 Public
college students may find other legal theories to support their censor-
ship claims, but private college students may face insurmountable bar-
riers if they lose the Leonard Law's protection.1 96
192. See A.B. 2581, 2005-06 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (passed by California Sen-
ate Aug. 10, 2006); Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277 (decided Aug. 15, 2006).
193. See Federis, supra note 134, at 1; Sternberg, supra note 21, at 1.
194. See Digest of Education Statistics, Table 189, supra note 94.
195. See Steffen, supra note 101, at 143, 159 (discussing judicial recognition of First
Amendment protection for public university student journalists and private university stu-
dents as a result of the state action doctrine); see also id. at 162 (noting that some state
constitutions provide more protection for free expression than the Federal Constitution).
196. See id. at 170. ("[C]obbling together various statutory, policy-based, contractual,
common law and state constitutional approaches to protecting press rights leaves a consid-
erable number of [private college] students and faculty without legal protection.").
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IV. The Legislature to the Rescue: Suggested Amendments
to the Leonard Law and Education Code Section
66301
A. Protecting Private College Students from Hosty Through
Amendments to the Leonard Law
In California, Hosty captured the senate floor when a key legal
advisor to the largest state university system in the country suggested
that Hosty permits increased censorship of student newspapers. 197
Helwick's comment inspired California's legislature to respond with
A.B. 2581.198
A.B. 2581 goes further than any other state law in bringing the
full range of First Amendment protections to the college press.199 Jim
Ewart, counsel for the California Newspaper Publishers Association,
was "thrilled" with Schwarzenegger's decision to sign A.B. 2581.200
"This law sends a very strong message to administrators that the stu-
dent press is just as deserving of strong free press protection as profes-
sional media."20 1 Even though it is not California's first college
speech-friendly law,20 2 A.B. 2581 shows that California lawmakers are
still attentive to the "marketplace of ideas" that college campuses fos-
ter when students are free to express their views without fear of disci-
plinary sanctions.
The bill's sponsor, Assemblyman Yee, hailed the merits of A.B.
2581:
College journalists deserve the same protections as any other jour-
nalist .... Having true freedom of the press is essential on college
campuses and it is a fundamental part of a young journalists [sic]
training for the real world. Allowing a school administration to
censor is contrary to the democratic process and the ability of stu-
dent newspapers to serve as the watchdog and bring sunshine to
the actions of school administrators. 20 3
197. See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1. The CSU system is "the largest in the coun-
try." Mayor, Memo, supra note 93, at 1.
198. See BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 1-2; see also Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1
(stating A.B. 2581 was drafted in response to Hosty).
199. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 1785. In particular, "the legislation makes California
the first state in the nation to specifically prohibit censorship of college student newspa-
pers." Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
200. Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
201. Id.
202. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 (a) (West Supp. 2007); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367
(West 2002).
203. Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1. Yee focused on the protection A.B. 2581
would give to college newspapers, since the bill was passed in response to the CSU general
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However, section 66301, as amended by A.B. 2581, only protects
public college students from administrative censorship. 20 4 As one way
to close the gap between public and private students' legislative pro-
tections from censorship, private college students could seek desig-
nated public-forum status for their newspapers. Public college
students in the Seventh Circuit had little success with this approach
after Hosty.20 5 Similarly, before California's legislature responded to
Helwick's memo with A.B. 2581, CSU's media advisers encouraged
student newspapers at CSU campuses to obtain designated public-fo-
rum status.20 6 The rationale for seeking public-forum status is that the
papers would be exempt from "any effects the Hosty decision may have
in California." 20 7 However, these designated public-forum labels are
inferior alternatives to state legislation prohibiting administrative cen-
sorship. If students and universities must agree on the status of stu-
dent newspapers piecemeal, some newspapers may not achieve the
more protective public-forum status. 20 8 Also, college speech appears
in many contexts other than newspapers, such that designated public-
forum status for a handful of newspapers will not cover the extent of
college students' speech.
In light of these considerations, legislation is a superior tool to
provide private college students in California with meaningful redress
for administrative censorship. 20 9
In California's 255 private degree-granting educational institu-
tions, students must rely on the ambiguous language of the Leonard
Law to protect them from the type of administrative censorship dis-
counsel's comment that Hosty might allow school administrators to censor CSU student
newspapers. Id. However, A.B. 2581 prohibits college administrators from censorship of
"speech or other communication," not just college newspapers. A.B. 2581, 2005-06 As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). The main accomplishment of A.B. 2581 is its expansion of
liability to the administrators of California's public colleges and universities. See CAL. EDuc.
CODE § 66301 (a). Before the bill was passed, Education Code section 66301 only prohib-
ited the Trustees, Regents, and Boards from disciplining their public college students. See
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 (West 2003).
204. See discussion supra Part III.A.
205. The Student Press Law Center encouraged universities in the Seventh Circuit to
grant public-forum status to their newspapers in writing, but only four schools granted that
status as of late 2006. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 1804.
206. See id.
207. Mayor, Memo, supra note 93, at 1.
208. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 1804.
209. See Sanders, supra note 70, at 176 ("[T] he best bet for protecting college students'
free speech rights would be the adoption of a modified version of the California college
press free statute.").
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played in Hosty.2 10 Unfortunately, the Leonard Law's protection of pri-
vate college students' speech falls short of section 66301's protections
for public college students' speech. A comparison of the two laws evi-
dences subtle differences in the wording of the Leonard Law that may
lead to a narrower scope of speech protection for students at private
institutions. 2t1
Because private college students are not protected by section
66301 or A.B. 2581, the legislature should pass a sister bill to provide
private college students with clear statutory protection from adminis-
trative censorship.21 2 The amendment should forbid officials at every
level of private college administration from disciplining students for
speech that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment.21 3
The sister bill could add an additional provision to the language of
section 94367(a). 214 The newly amended statute would read: "No pri-
vate postsecondary educational institution or its administrators shall
make or enforce any rule subjecting any student .... ." Alternatively,
the following provision (e) could also be added: "(e) Nothing in this
section prohibits a student from suing an administrator, officer, or other official
of the private postsecondary educational institution in part (b), even if the
individual's actions do not constitute disciplinaiy sanctions by the postsecon-
dary institution." This provision would give notice to private university
administrators that they may be held individually liable for censor-
ship, even if the institution employing them cannot be held liable for
their actions. This provision would also reduce the possibility of pro-
tracted vicariously liability disputes between the institution and ad-
ministrators because the administrator would not escape liability by
210. There were 255 private institutions of higher learning in California as of 2005. See
Table 244, supra note 94; see also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 732-33 (7th Cir. 2005).
Hosty presents the classic censorship scenario involving "a clash between a school's admin-
istration and its students." Nimick, supra note 44, at 968.
211. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301 (West Supp. 2007) with CAL. Etuc. CODE
§ 94367 (West 2002).
212. This sister bill would ensure that private college students will not need to over-
come vicarious liability disputes when they bring Leonard Law claims against adminis-
tratorsSee Part III.B. supra.
213. The language could model section 66301 by specifically enumerating tides of high
ranking officials, as well as prohibiting any administrator from imposing disciplinary sanc-
tions. Such an amendment could read: "No president, chancellor, director, or board mem-
ber, nor any administrator of a private postsecondary institution, shall make or enforce any
rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanction . . . ." By mirroring section 66301, as
amended by A-B. 2581, administrators would not be able to evade the Leonard Law by
hiding behind private institutional entities.
214. See CAL. Enuc. CODE § 94367(a).
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asserting that the statute only prohibits the institutional entity from
censoring students.
These proposed amendments to the Leonard Law are also consis-
tent with the legislative intent behind A.B. 2581.215 The California
Legislature passed A.B. 2581 to specifically prohibit public college ad-
ministrators from expanding their censorship of public college stu-
dents under Hosty's reasoning because the original version of section
66301 did not encompass an administrator's actions. 21 6 If the Leonard
Law is not amended in a similar fashion, private college students
bringing Leonard Law claims may not be able to sue administrators
directly for censorship. Leland Yee did not differentiate between pub-
lic and private college students' speech when he explained the merits
of A.B. 2581: "Having true freedom of the press is essential on college
campuses .... Allowing a school administration to censor is contrary
to the democratic process and the ability of a student newspaper to
serve as the watchdog and bring sunshine to the actions of school
administrators. 2 1 7
B. Neutralizing Antebi's Threat to College Speech by Amending the
Leonard Law and Section 66301
Following Antebi's reasoning, the plain language of the Leonard
Law can be interpreted to limit standing to currently-enrolled stu-
dents. 2 8 Because the California Supreme Court denied Antebi's peti-
tion for review,219 and because students have limited power to
demand public-forum status for their media,220 California's legislature
should cure the deficiency that Antebi reads into the Leonard Law. As
section 66301 and the Leonard Law have very similar language, a leg-
islative amendment patching the Antebi loophole in the Leonard Law
could also apply to section 66301.
First, any amendment would need to specify that recent gradu-
ates or expelled students have standing to sue under the statutes if
they were censored or disciplined for speech or other expressive activ-
ity that occurred while they were students. In this way, college admin-
istrators could not expel students and then claim that the former
students lack standing because they are not enrolled.
215. See BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 1-2.
216. See id.
217. Mayor, California, supra note 4, at 1.
218. See Antebi v. Occidental Coll., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 280 (Ct. App. 2006).
219. 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14130, at *1 (Cal. Oct. 25, 2006).
220. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 1804.
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Second, the amendment would need to specify that only recently
enrolled former students can bring their claims, so as to ensure that
both parties have access to evidence when claims are brought and to
eliminate indefinite liability for universities and their administrators.
The amendment would quantify what "recently" means by providing a
fixed grace period or statute of limitations for former students to file
their censorship claims. The statute of limitations could extinguish all
claims of disciplinary sanctions when a one or two year period expires
after the students leave. Beginning the statute of limitations after stu-
dents lose their enrollment status will provide a longer grace period
than when the statute of limitations is trigged by the disciplinary sanc-
tions because students might be censored long before they leave col-
lege. If the statute of limitations begins to run after the student
graduates, students will have more time to negotiate an agreement or
appeal the disciplinary decision within the school's internal dispute
resolution procedures. 221 Antebi participated in some internal dispute
resolution procedures, though he was censored near the end of his
tenure at Occidental. 222
These standing amendments incorporated into section 94367(b)
might read:
Any student or former student who was enrolled in a private post-
secondary institution at the time that the institution made or en-
forced any rule in violation of subdivision (a) may commence a
civil action to obtain appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief,
as determined by the court, within a two year period following the
student's departure from the institution.223
Similar language could be substituted into section 66301 (b): "Any stu-
dent who was enrolled in an institution, as specified in subdivision (a), at the
time that the institution . *.".."224 With these proposed revisions, former
students who were censored for their expression while they were stu-
dents will be allowed a reasonable time to pursue their censorship
claims under sections 66301 and 94367. College students are not al-
ways aware of their rights and remedies and should not be expected to
221. The former advisor for The Innovator asserted that the Hosty plaintiffs "tried every-
thing they could before filing a lawsuit .... [I]t was the lawyers that advised [them] to
sue." Editors Sue University for First Amendment Violations, STUDENT PREss L. CENTER, Mar. 30,
2001, at 1, available at http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=259&year-2001. Antebi ap-
pealed the associate dean of students' decision to discipline him with the President and
Board of Trustees of Occidental College. Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279. However, the
appellate record did not include the outcome of his appeal. Id.
222. According to Antebi, Occidental's administration finished investigating him for
his speech "just days before his graduation." Opening Brief, supra note 121, at *28.
223. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(b) (West 2002).
224. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66301(b) (West Supp. 2007).
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call a lawyer immediately after administrators react to their speech.
Antebi was censored in his final days as a college student;225 it is not
surprising that he filed suit after he graduated. 226 Under this revised
version of the Leonard Law, Antebi would have had standing to pur-
sue his free speech claims against Occidental College and its
administrators.
Conclusion
California's legislature diligently guarded the "marketplace of
ideas" present on college campuses when it passed A.B. 2581 in re-
sponse to the threat of Hosty v. Carter. However, A.B. 2581 protects
only public college students' speech from administrative censorship,
failing to do the same for the speech rights of private college students.
When administrators at private universities censor students for contro-
versial views, the silenced students must rely on the Leonard Law.
While the Leonard Law forbids "private postsecondary institution [s]"
from disciplining students for their speech or expression, 227 it does
not mention administrators. Courts may dismiss Leonard Law claims
asserted directly against administrators because the statute is silent as
to whether individuals may be sued. Without the deterrent effect of
Leonard Law liability, private university administrators may censor stu-
dents without fear of retribution.
In order to discourage private college administrators from cen-
soring students' speech, the California Legislature should amend the
Leonard Law to specifically foreclose censorship by these individuals.
Through this legislation, California would achieve parity between the
speech protections afforded to public and private college students.
In addition to this amendment, the legislature should also repair
the damage the Leonard Law sustained under Antebi v. Occidental and
prevent collateral damage to section 66301. Antebi held that private
college students must be currently enrolled to bring suit under the
Leonard Law, reasoning that the statutory language compelled this
requirement.22 By inventing a current-enrollment requirement for
Leonard Law standing, Antebi decreases opportunities for censored
private college students to invoke the Leonard Law's protections. At
the same time, Antebi encourages private college administrators to ex-
225. See supra notes 175, 221 and accompanying text.
226. Antebi graduated from Occidental in 2004. He filed suit in superior court in
March, 2005. See Antebi, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 279.
227. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a).
228. See 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
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pel students to divest them of standing or censor them immediately
prior to their graduation. Unfortunately, section 66301 could be sub-
ject to Antebi's questionable logic since the statutes share nearly identi-
cal language. Consequently, section 66301 and the Leonard Law
should be amended to close the Antebi standing loophole by allowing
recent graduates to sue if they were censored while they were
students.
It may seem natural that college students-young adults of legal
voting age-should be afforded the same free speech rights on cam-
pus that they enjoy in their communities. However, public college stu-
dents in California have only enjoyed the right to express
controversial views on college campuses for the past forty years.2 29 Col-
leges and universities provide a "marketplace of ideas"-an open fo-
rum for learning and exchange of opinions where students engage in
critical analyses of everything from the campus administration to
world politics. Students emerge from this setting with exposure to a
variety of views and theories and the seasoned ability to apply their
questioning minds in their communities. Regulation and censorship
of college students' speech not only trample their rights but also re-
duce the pool of future political commentators, investigative journal-
ists, and creative thinkers by discouraging full freedom of expression.
California lawmakers should continue their honorable mission of pro-
tecting the "marketplace of ideas" at public and private institutions by
amending the Leonard Law to bar administrative censorship and sup-
plementing the Leonard Law and section 66301 to allow recent gradu-
ates to sue for censorship by university administrators.
229. See supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text.
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